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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE 01!1 UTAH F \ L E. D 
Plaintiff and Responde-nt, 1.~1 ;··1 \l 4 - 1960 . 
-vs.~ f]m - ------~ 
-----r- ----~--· ~ ·- -~' t.r:Jc.:~~~~: ut~b 
- r·· .... ~ ._,IL.u •• 
1\lACI{ ~fERRILL RI,TENBURGH, ~ ... No. 9089 
JR., and LEONARD WARNER. 
BOWNE, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
APPELLANT BOWNE'S PETITION 
FOR RE-HEARING AND 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
HANSEN AND MILLER 
Counsel for Appellatn.t Bowtle 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TARLE OF CO~TEXTS 
Page 
APPELLANT BOWNE~s PETITION FOR RE~IIEARING____________ 1 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING.---·····--- 3 
ARGUM:EXT-
POINT ~ The Appell ant was denie-d the Equal Protection 
of the Lav..~s ) n that Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-2 (1953) is 
vioJ ative of the Constitution of the United States~ 
Amend. XIV, and the Court misconstrued Appellant~s 
Point and A rg-u men t i 11 this regard as it was stated in his 
B:rief on Appeal------- . -------------------------------------------------- -------------- ... - 3 
Authorities Cited 
Cases 
J\.luller v. Hale, 138 Califr 163~ 71 Pac. 81 (1902) ----·---·-·----·---·----···-----10, 11 
People v. QtLaughlin, 3 Utah 133, 1 Pa.c. 653 ( 1882 ) ........ --............ .. .. 5, 8 
People v. Pilbro1 85 CaL App~ 789t 260 Ps.c. 303 ( 1927) -------·-----·------10) 11 
State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 P. 2d 92[) (1938)-------------------------------- 7, 12 
Statut~~ 
Con~.t.1 amend. XIV _______________________________________ ·-------------------------·----lt 3, 4t 12J 13 
R. S. § 105-32-6 (1933) ---------------------------------------·--------·----------------------------- 5t 6 
T:tah Code Ann. § 77-30~2 (1953) ----------·--------------------------·----1, 3-9~ 11-13 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-15 { 1953} ~-------------------··--------------·------.------5-9, 12 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-31-6 (1953) -----------------------------· ··--------· ·----------·- 6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
81\\.TE OF L-.-Tl~ .. H 
J:llain.ti ff an-d R espo·nd en.t, 
~vs.-
)LA.CK ~LERRILL RIVENBURGH, 
JR .. , and l_JJ~~OXARD \\rltRNER 
BOWNE, 
De fen da:nts and A p pelloots. 
Case 
No. 9089 
APPELLANT BOWNE'S PETITION 
FOR RE-HEARING 
The Appellant I.Jeonard 'Varner I3.o,vne respectfully 
requests the Court t.o set aAide its decision heretofo1·e 
rendered on September 71 1960, and to grant a re-hearing 
in the above entitled matter for the reason that said de-
cision is not in aceordance 1v1 t11 the la'v in that; 
POINT 
THE APPELLANT \VAS DENIED THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION OF THE LAWS IN THAT UTAH 
CODE ANN. ~ 77-30-2 (1953) IS VIOLATIVE OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES) 
AMEND. XIV~ AND THE COURT MISCON~ 
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STRUED APPELLANT'S POINT .AND ARGU-
:MENT IN THIS REGARD AS IT WAS STATED 
IN HIS BRIEF ON APPEAL. 
rrhe Appellant Bowne submits here,vith a brief 
memorandum in support of the foregojng petition. 
Dated NovenJber 4} 1960. 
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IN THE SUPRE~1E COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
srr.\reE OF l:T~\ l f 
l)!a/nt;.tr aud llrst)ondetlf,. 
- -,.s. ~ -
'l~\\ 1 l( ~1ERRILL RI\TEXBCl{Gll, ). 
Jlt., and LE():\ARD "\VA RX~:R 
lH)\V~E, 
Defc·JJ fl (J..Jt.f:.s· au d .J ppPlla·nts. 
Case 
:\o. 9089 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR RE-HEARING 
POI:\T 
THE APPELLANT WAS DENIED THE EQUAL 
PROTECTION OF THE LAWS IN THAT UTA.H 
CODE ANN. ·~· 77-30-2 (1953) IS VIOLATIVE OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES~ 
AMEND~ XIV, AND THE COURT MISCON-
STRUED APPELLANT~S POINT AND ARGL1-
MENT IN THIS REGARD AS IT WAS STATED 
IN HIS BRIEF ON APPEAL. 
The main point of appeal 'vhieh the ..:\ppellant Bo,vne 
relied upon "·n~ misconstrued l)y the (}ourt. It is his posi~ 
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t.ion that he ,\·us denied the cquul protection of the la,vs in 
that [tah Code Ann. ~ 77 -30-~ (1953) is violative of the 
(~onstitut.ion of the l.Jnited States, Amend. XIV. The 
(~on rt in itR opinion states as follov .. ~~:._;; 
'' (~oun::;e] for Bov-.'ne at·krlO,vledges the lavl of 
t l1 e N emier rase but V{as attempting to lay a foun ... 
dation for the Constitutional question, primarily 
on the clause of the equal protection of the laws, 
on the th-eory that Riren.b 1-1.rqh had 10 atul two chal-
lenges, 1.r l1 c rr' as h ·is ( · h f? l J t o u 7 y h a (I t u~ o r ·hal-
1 wn.ges.,, ( ~~mphasis supplied) 
rfhc Court then proceeds to analyze the case Oil this 
theo1·y, and finally eon-elude:.-:; tl1n t t11cre is no denial of a 
constitutional right 
rrh lR was HOt the theory of the appellant Bov.-Tne. .A. 
recitation \vas ineludcd in appellant\.; brief indicating 
that Bo,vne had conditionally agreed to the selections of 
the defendant Rivenburgh. Thi~ V{as merely by way of 
explanation. ..A. t no time luis Ro,vne argued that he '-ras 
denied the equal protection of the laws in that the othel' 
uef endant, Rivenburgh "\\TaA able to exercise a greater 
n unl ln~ 1· of peremp1 or y e ha ller1 gl~~. 
The appel1ant Bo,vne \3 theory in regards to the 14th 
.Amendment \Vas not restricted i o a consideration of one 
joint defendant in the case as against the other joint de-
fendant in tlte case. The class "~1liell ,\~e \\~tt'e concerned 
'vith "·as tllat of all and nny joint defendants in any 
(·riTnina1 cH~(\ lf any joint defendant ran not agree 1vi.th 
tJ1e other joint defendants as to the exercise of peremp-
tory challenges, then he is d(~llt()d the right to those ellal-
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lenges as g-ran tc·d in Utah ( ~od t\ ~A..nn § 77 ~30~ L) ( 1953). 
"Under the triaJ court'~ ruling and under Ctah Code .1\.nn. 
§ 77-30-2 ( 1953) ( v.; hi (•}! modifies ~ 7 7-30-15 as to join~ de-
fendants), a c1 a st.; is constituted \V hich ineludcs all joint 
defendants who cannot agree as to the exercise of the 
peremptories. If the appellant had not been tri(ld jointly 
he \vould have been able to exereise all of the perempt.or-
ie~ granted under ~ 7'7-30-15. Since he \VB.~ tried jointl;J 
and could not agree 'vith the other defendant as to the 
(l x ereise of the peremptories, he -~ras limited to 0111 y 1 \VO 
peremptorif~ s under 0 7 7 -30-2+ 
From 1878 until 19B5~ 1Ttah had a statute v.rhich en-
titled any person charged 'vith a felony to a separate triaL 
See Section 105.32.,6 of the Revised Statutes of 19B:t .i\.H 
long as a joint defendant had the right to demand a 
scpa rate trial, he had the means to insure that he \Vould 
receive at least as man~y peremptory challenges as ,~.-{l-I~C 
provided for in § 77-30-15. In Peopte v. 0 'Laughlin, :-) 
lTtah 133~ 1 Pac .. 653 (1882), the Utah (~ouri reject eel 
sound argument or counsel for the defense to the effect 
that each joint defendant should be entitled to. exercise 
tl!·P full number of peremptorics .. The reason the (~ourt so 
acted was clearly stated as follo\rR: 
~~By the .~tutute riot is made a felony, and se(·-
tion 262 of the <~riminal procedure act giYCS to any 
ueferulaut jointly inrlicted 'vith another or others, 
for a felony, the right to a .... ·epa.rate f·rial, if he re-
quires it. .:\.ll the defendant~ having v.ta1ved tl1is 
priv1lcge and cleclared thci r election to be i ried 
jointly, their defcn~e 'vas joint and not several, 
and no one of them had authority to control the 
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conduct of the defense~'' (Id. at 1 Pae. 656) ( ~m­
phasis supplied) 
On .JJ areh 14, 193;J~ section 105-32~6 ''"as amended to read 
~uhstantially the same as lTtall Code A HTI, § 77 r31-6 
( 1~~;)3). l,rom that time to the pres~nt, a joint defendant 
ba8 lHnl no right to demand a separate:_:. triaL A separate 
t r i a I rna~-' o nl }' be grant ( ~ d i n t.h e d i ~ { · n · t.i on of t l1 e t riu I 
j uuge4 The la 'vs of this state no longer insure that a joint 
defcnrlnHt \vill hav·e tl1e Tigl1t to the fn11 uuml~t~r of per-
emptory challenges granted by § 77" -30-l.j. A separate 
elass is tln1s created l~y ~ 7T-30-2, and joiut defcnd.a11ts 
\rho cannot agree n:--1 i.o the ~xerciRe of peremptory chal~ 
lenges, and thus find themselves iTi tlHl.t c~1a1-3~, are limitt~d 
to t'vo pcreinptories, if lhe offensP charged is punishab1t· 
l}y d(la th~ or one peremptory, if the ofTen~e rharged is not 
punif~hable by deatlt 'Th1~ claRs is~ of course, to be eon-
trasted ''"ith defendants generally ,\·ho in similar eirrum-
stanees \Vould be e11tit.lerl to exercise the n1unbcr of 
pt:remptories provided for in ·-~- ii -30-15~ \\-llich reads as 
follovrs: 
"Tl1e state and defend. ant ~hall each be al1o"·ed 
the follo,ving nurn bl\r of peremptory eha1lenges ~ 
( .u) Ten, if the ofT{\11 ~P r.harged is puni~ha blc 
hy death. 
(b) ~~our~ if the oiTen~(l eharged is a felony not 
punishable by death. 
(c) rrhree, if the offen~e rhargetl is a mis •. le-
meanor. ~" 
It is cleat that a joint dPfP11dant "\Yho (_~annot agrc(l 
,\-[ t.h the oth<\ r joint d( •fenrl.nn t s ~l ~ to the PXl1 tl' [se of per-
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Pmptory t~hnlleuges \viii lut \·e under ·§ 77-30-2~ the right to 
t)Xl~rei~( .. far fe,vcr peremptories than a defendarlt "\vho 
i~ tri (~d sepa ru ttl)"· .. In fact in tl1e instant case the appel-
lant 'vas l't~Htri('i()d to only t'vo peremptory clJallenges. 
Even n defendant charge1l with a misdemeanor i.s entitled 
tP three 11cremptory challenges. See l~tah (~our~ Ann .. 
f. 7 7-30-13 ( 19;]3). In othct \vorrls, ~ "77 -30-2 d iffp rentia tes 
be~ 'vr.cn t'vo classes of defendants one of \vhieh i8 ex-
cluded from the suhstaiJtive provisjons or § "77-30-15~ rrhe 
effect of this section is to discriminate against any joint 
defendant "rho cannot agree 'vith tl1e others. 
This Court set forth the proper standard \Vith v,rhich . 
to determine the constitutionality of an act "'hich i~ q ucs-
tioned as denying the equal protection of the la"\V8 in l)la.fe 
v .JJ as(h 1, 94 C tah 501, 78 P ~ 2d 920 ( 1938) ~ In tltis case, 
'vhi(_~J• has h(~come a clast:Ji(' to students of jurisprudence, 
Justice Wolf indicated that a denial of equal proteciion, 
in oruer to be unconstitutional, required diserjmii~ation 
whic.h 'vas unreasonable or arbitrary. The Court f11rt.her 
stated as follows: 
''It is only v.rhere son1e persons or transactions 
exrlnded from the operat.ion of the lfl"\V are as to 
the subject matter of the Ia1\' in no differentiable 
elass from those included i11 its operation that the 
Ju-,v is discriminatory in the sense of lleing arhi-
trat~y and uneonst1tutioual. If a reasonable basis 
to differentiate those i11eluded from those exeluded 
from it~ operation caJt be found, it must be held 
constitutionaL'' 
'Vhat is the differentiation. bei\\'cen the elassPs (~reat­
ed by~ 77-30-2? The only differentiation is the procedural 
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aspect of a joint triaL Certainly this is not. a reasonable 
differentiation. The differentiation has nothing to do \\ .. itl1 
the crime charged. Tlle defendant ir1 either class must 
make his O\Vn defense)' and if he is unsur.ce~sful, the de-
feJldRnt in either clasg must pay for the crime personal1y. 
The differentiation is unreasonable in vi0"v of the faet that 
the defendant ca nnoi determine the class in '\\! hich he may 
find himselt The basis for the Court's reasoning i11 
People v~ O'IAJ.ughiin~ s-upra; l1as disallJH.~,;lred. 'Vhether 
a clef endant is included in the operation of § 7 7-.30-15 or 
excluded by virtue of ~ 77-30-2 has notlrin~ tu do "\\·itl1 h1~ 
O\VTI intcn1. or po\ver ... ~ significant indication of the arbi-
trary nature of this differentiation lies in the fact that 
the deputy county attorney, \\:ho perchance drafts the 
eomplaint, l1as more control over the class in vthicl1 a 
drfendant "\\ill be placed than any otlu}r person. In t.he 
in~tant case one of throe persons implicated in the crime 
v.ras tried separately)' while the appellant Bo,vne was 
tried jointly v..ith another .. In all substantive aspects the 
classes are the same~ It is not reasonable to discrimi-
nate against a defendant merely because, for the conven-
ience of the state, he is triod jointly with others .. Such a 
rul~ can only be productive of abuse and injustice .. Such 
a rule makes shallow mockery of our Constitutional 
rights. 
r_r here is no rea so na ble basis upon "\V hich to differ--
entiate here. In attempting to deduce the purpose behind 
the succcs.~ive net~ of the legislature, vle find f·ouflicting 
intents \vhich can bt"~~t. be explained by inadvertence. In 
granting a right to certain pcrempt.orie~, the legislaturr-
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di~p1ay\~d n n inteut to safc.guard a fair trial to everyone. 
I?erempto ~"Y challenges are ordinarily held to be V\:ithin 
t 11<.~ d i ~('l't~ 1 i 0 !I of t I H_~ 1 t~gisla turc .. s(~(·1 ion '77 -~i0-15 gran ted 
rig-hts 'vbirh under the majority rule, indiYidnals could 
not demand us a matter of constitutional right.. Section 
77-30-2 modified ·~ T7,30~1il to ar.r.ommoda.te a joint triul.. 
rl,he only vnHd purpose of§ 77-30-2 i~ to expedite the ad-
ministration of justice. Certainly it "~aH not the intent 
of the legislature to limit the joint def c11dH n t charged "- i th 
a felony to any number of per em pto ry cha1lengr.8 short 
of that set forth in ~ 77-30-15. The legis1at.uro in fact 
granted the joint defendant cxtt·a challenges "\vhich could 
be exercised separately. In the beginning and for fifty-
seven years, these t'vo sections 'vere in perfect harmony 
\\'ith the legislative intent to safeguard to aJl H J'ai l' trial. 
During all of this time and until1935 if a joint defendant 
coulrl not ag r·ee fl s to the C).:P. rr.i se of the peremptories, 
then he could demand a separate trial and i llereby sceure 
the full numller of peremptory cha1lcngcs provided l·or in 
{. 77 -30-lj. "\Vhen the defendant could no longe I' demand 
a separate trial, it bec.ame possible for ·~ 77-30-2 1 o pro-
duce a re~ult r..ontrar~y to the origina1 legislat.i v<~ intent .. 
Sueh a result was achieved in the instant case. Had not 
the defendant been in the elass excluded fTnm the op(~t·a­
tion of ·~. 77-30-15 by ~ 77-30-2, lu; could have exercised 
ten peremptory challenge~. ~\ 8 it vlas he -could e-xc t'(' i~e 
but t\vo such challenges. 
The purpo8e of cxpedieney is still present in 
§ 77 -30-~. This is not ~ufficient to justify the arbitrary 
differentiation found herein. Expediency must be 
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\Veighed against our traditional guarantees of liberty and 
justice. rrhe ron~titutional right. of the appellant to tllu 
equal protection of the la.,vs far out,veigh8 any considera-
tions of cxpcdi {~H(·y .. 
ln tl1e opinion in the instant case, 'vhich \\~:IH r·ell-
dered on Sf~pt.(_~nll)(_lr 7~ 1.960, the Court relies on t\vo Cali-
fornia casef{. Both of t1u~sP (~as(ls ('an he di~tinguished 
fro1n the instant fact situation~ In. Jl utler v. 11 ale, 138 
Calif. 16:1, 7J PH(\ 81 ( 1902), the joint defcrldants joined 
in challenging three jnror8~ The elcfend.a11t IIa ll· cllal-
lcuged a fourth, but since the other defendant (the San 
Franejs('o Di~tric~t. 'rclcgraph Company) refused to join 
in this final challenge, the court overruled the ehallenge. 
Tl~ e defendant Hale brought the a ppea.L The Califori1ia 
con rt rej(~<"~ h_ld t 1~ L~ contc1~tion that lialc ";""as denied the 
equal protection of the la,v.s. The court indicated that tlu· 
same rule applied to all the parties to a·n a-(h.OJI V/here 
t1Ley are united \vitl1 other~ either a.s plaint·iff . .::. or defr:jld-
a.n f R. } ll 1 h l ~ c-i 1." if 8 e.tio ll the COUft C-On fin Cd its rcaSO ning 
to a conAirlera.tion of the indivit"lual case and the parties 
hefore it+ T n a ei vil rase this may be quite proper~ In a 
ciY1 ~ case one judgment only is recorded. One satisfac-
tion pays for alL The court'~ concern is 11ecessa ril:- the 
measure of fairne~s n~ hetVtTeen the parties before it. rrhis 
is not so inn criminal case 'vhcre the measure of fairness 
rcq u i r~)~ n 8i.-n-Nle j)rOcfdural .sla·udard for all who roay 
he charged. 
1 n JJ eo1)l (' ,~. P-il b ro, 85 C~a L App. 789, :!60 Pac. 303 
( 19:17), the defendant Pilhro refused to join in any of 1 h (· 
challenges nud rrtPl"Pl~· ~tated that he wa~ satisfied \vith 
10 
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the jury as it 'vas. In this criminal ca~~t the other de-
fenuant, \\Ta 1sh~ brought the uppeal. It \viii he noted 
llJa t in Loth J/ ull(Jr and Pilbo the appeiJant 'vas the dc-
r~·ndant \\7 ho \\·as anxious to agree <l s to the chaUeng<.~S. 
It [s not evident from the opinion in l)ilbro tl1at the con-
~titutional question of equal protection wHs even argued4 
The JJ.utlr.r ease 'vas cited 'vit.h a brief explanation of its 
holdin~. 11 i~ not apparent that this brief mentioJl of 
equal protection in anything but dictum in the Pilbro case. 
Certainly the theory of the Jl!uller case, \Vhieh ap-
parently influenced the Court in the inst.ant case, is not 
the theory upon ~,.hich the appellant Bo~e raised this 
constitutional question. rrhe Court's opinion on this 
point is shallo\V and ill-reasoned. rrhc Court Htatcs as 
follo,vs: 
"Section 77-30-2 docs not deny the equal pro-
tection of the laws, and thus violate the Fourteenth 
~\mendment, for tho reason that the sa.m.e r-ule 
applies to all ihe de/en-da~nt.~ ali.ke u::hen they are 
frifd jointly amd does not d·;s(:r·i-rni-ua.f.e against a·n.y 
on.e dr/e'J-ula·n-t \vhen the s1 n t.utc is follo,vcd f-H~ in-
terpreted by the N cmier cn8e. In other V{orrls the 
test of equal protert.ion undel" the HlH ute in ques-
tion is not ba~ed on its appli{'rt t.ion to a joint de-
fendant "\vho refuses to follo""· tl1c statute in the 
r..olJeetive exereisc of his peremptory challenges~ 
as eontended h.v defendant Bo\vne. Sinec th.r. stat· 
Ide a))pl ie.r.: the san~e to f"'fl(:h jnint dcfP·uda.nt ·t.}J. the 
():1:ercise n.f f.h cir perr·u1 pto·ry chaUen.ge.~ collect·irr--:-
l/f, it is not discriminatory~ and Bo,vne was not 
denied the equal proteet.ion of the la,v. n 
With this reasoning the c:onrt could never find an un-
reason a hle differentiation betw·een class{~H ~Ti thin the 
11 
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meaning of t1ta:fe v~ M aso·n., supra.. The Court in fact looks 
only to one class, and states that there is no dis-crimina-
tion since aiJ defendants within that one elass are treated . 
equally. \V.itll this analysis the C·ourt cou1d justil\ a 
statute which flatly provided that all persons tried 
jointly (~ould exercise no peremptorics \vhatsoevr.r+ This 
same reasoning \vould support a statute which denied 
n.ny peremptory r.}Jtdlenges to defer1dants having- red hair~ 
since t11c same rule 1~.rould apply to all the defendants ~1like 
\vhen they l1ad red hair and v,~ould not discriminate 
against any one defendant. 
~rhe C~ourt's reasoning renders the 14th .Amendment 
to the Constitution meaningless. W11ile it is true that in 
construing a statute, a1l doubts should be resolved in 
favor of ~onstitutionality~ this rule does not require 11~ 
to ignore the Constitution, or apply it in such a man-
ner a.s to reduce it to a set of meaningless generalities~ 
the vestige of a determination to be governed by la,\~s 
rather than men. If it is to have any meaning at all~ the 
14th Amendment must be applied as suggested in State v. 
Jl ason, supra.. Certainly § 77 ... 30-2 creates a separate 
class of defendants, riz+, those tried jointly who calll~ ot 
agree 'v-ith the other joint defendants as to the exercisr of 
the peremptory challenges, the other class being all other 
defendants granted rights under ~ 77-30-15. Certainly 
there is d i~crimina tion, si nPe these defendants are ex-
cluded from t.he substantive provisions of ~ 77 -30~15 .. 
(\~rta[nly the discrimination is unreasonable and arbi-
trary. The t"tvo ela.sse~ of defc·Hdunts are in all r·espects 
identiea l e X('t ~pt for the proc.edural aspect of tl ~e joint 
12 
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trial in one class4 There is no purpose which V{ould jus-
tify sueh a dificrentiation, in fact the legislature prob-
ably never intended it. When the 14th .ltmendment is 
applied properly, there is only one ansvler, the appellant 
Yras denied the equal protection of the la\\-'8 in that Utah 
Code Ann .. § 7 7-30-2 ( 1953) is violative of the Constitution 
of the United State.s. 
CONCLVSION 
The Appellant Bov.7le respectfully urges that the 
Court will find its decision rendered in this c_l as e to be 
untenable and therefore grant a re-hearing. 
Respectfully submittedt 
HANSEN AND MILLER 
Cownsel fo·r AppeUant Bown-e 
410 Empire Building 
Salt I Jake City, Utah 
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